Military History Word of the Day – "Castrametation"

Prospect Hill, Virginia. Camp of the 13th Regiment New York Cavalry. (”Seymour Light”)

Photo: Prospect Hill, Virginia. Camp of the 13th Regiment New York Cavalry. (“Seymour Light”)
[Library of Congress, CALL NUMBER: LC-B817- 7218]

While researching the influence of Jomini on the conduct of the American Civil War, I ran across an article by James L. Morrison, Jr., (Professor, History, Emeritus, York College of Pennsylvania) titled, “Educating the Civil War Generals: West Point, 1833 – 1861” which appeared in Military Affairs. He outlines the curriculum for students who would have made up a large part of the war’s leadership. It was heavily skewed toward science and engineering. But the courses on the study of the science of war included the following topics: 

  • “army organization
  • order of battle
  • castrametation [misspelled in the text as castramentation]
  • reconnaissance
  • outpost duties
  • attack and defense, and
  • the principles of strategy.”[i]

Castrametation caught my eye. Webster provides some insight into the origins of the word.

“\Cas`tra*me*ta”tion\, n. [F. castram[‘e]tation, fr. L. castra camp + metari to measure off, fr. meta limit.] (Mil.) The art or act of encamping; the making or laying out of a camp.Read this book” [ii]

A Military Dictionary and Gazetteer (first published in 1881 under title: A military and naval encyclopedia and available on Google Books here), puts a slightly different spin on it with the following definition:

“Castrametation. Is the art of laying out camps, and of placing the troops so that the different arms of the service shall afford support to each other in the best manner.”[iii]

I have added as a new word to “the terms” page here.
—-
[i] James L. Morrison, Jr., “Educating the Civil War Generals: West Point, 1833 – 1861,” Military Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 3. (Oct., 1974), pp. 109.
[ii] Castrametation. Dictionary.com. Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary. MICRA, Inc. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Castrametation (accessed: March 23, 2008).
[iii] Thomas Wilhelm, Military Art and Science, (L. R. Hamersly & co.: 1881) http://books.google.com/books?id=GHcrAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA95&lpg=PA95&dq=what+is+the+history+of+the+word+castrametation%3F&source=web&ots=vnQF5eKGfo&sig=evmHB_wX1onpWxy-eQ9bsZHkZFc&hl=en (accessed online March 21, 2008).

Jomini on the Nature of War – Part VI – The Conduct of War

jomini-cropped.jpgThis post continues the series of “Jomini on the Nature of War.” Part I: Introduction is available here, Part II: The Burgeoning Military Theorist here, Part III: The Founder of Modern Strategy here, Part IV: The Basics here, and Part V: Lines of Operation here.

Jomini cautions that there are a number of other circumstances that can affect the “nature and conduct of war” including that…

  • “a state may simply make war against another state
  • a state may make war against several states in alliance with each other
  • a state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy
  • a state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary
  • in the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning or after it has commenced.
  • the theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an ally, or upon its own.
  • if the war be one of invasions, it may be upon adjacent or distant territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and adventurous
  • it may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the enemy
  • the war may be a civil or a religious war.”[i]

He insists that war should always “be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but [that] great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case.”[ii]  “A regiment should always fight in nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by circumstances and events.”[iii]

lincolnmcclellan.gif
Antietam, Md. President Lincoln and Gen. George B. McClellan in the general’s tent (Oct. 1862). LOC

So the “principles of strategy are always the same,” but differences occur with the “political part of war, which is modified by the tone of communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of states and armies.”[iv]

Jomini outlines these specific circumstances in a description of each type of war and the principles and rules to follow (or not follow) in every one. For example, in “Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights,” he indicates that no rules can be laid down but to watch and to profit by every circumstance.[v] This leads to his conclusion that “war knows no rules.”[vi]

“Military science rests upon principle which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed.”[vii]


[i] Jomini, Antoine Henri de. The Art of War, trans. by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill., Special Edition, (El Paso: EL Paso Norte Press. 2005), 10-11.

[ii] Ibid..

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Ibid., 13.

[v] Ibid., 12.

[vi] Ibid.,13.

[vii] Ibid.

Jomini on the Nature of War – Part V – Lines of Operation

This post continues the series of “Jomini on the Nature of War.” Part I: Introduction is available here, Part II: The Burgeoning Military Theorist here, Part III: The Founder of Modern Strategy here, and Part IV: The Basics here.

“Principles were guides to action, not infallible mathematical calculations. Jomini The specific application of principles would vary with the thousand changing physical and psychological factors that made war ‘a great drama.’ Genius would defeat the military pendant, just as talent and experience would outdo the bumbling novice. But the principles themselves, whose truth is demonstrated by all military experience, could not be ignored without peril and, when followed, had ‘almost invariably’ (Presque en tout temps) brought victory.”[i]

 

 Jomini’s arguments for “immutable ‘principle’ of war” rested on the concept of “lines of operation” by which he meant…

  • “where an armed force fights,
  • for what objective, and
  • in what force relative to the total available military power of the state.”[ii]

He identified two types of lines of operation, those that are:

Union entrenchments near Kenesaw Mountain, Ga., 1864. 111-B-531.
  • Natural:
    • rivers,
    • mountains,
    • seacoasts,
    • oceans,
    • deserts, and
    • sheer distance through, over, and around which military operations must be conducted.”[iii]
    • Also included in this category are man-made, permanent structures that constrict the conduct of warfare including: fortifications, military bases, political boundaries and road networks.[iv]
  • Concerned exclusively with strategic choice about:
    • where to fight,First Manasas
    • to what purpose,
    • in what force, etc.[v]

[i – v] John Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 154, 166.

Photo: Union entrenchments near Kenesaw Mountain, Ga., 1864. 111-B-531. The National Archives.

Map: First Manasas

Prisoner of War: A First-Person Account

McCain

If you haven’t yet read John McCain’s account of his five-plus years as a POW, I recommend it. I ran across the 18-some page account today published on U.S. News and World Report here and it’s a fascinating read. McCain describes his landing and rough rescue from Truc Bac Lake near Hanoi which was captured in a photo viewable here. I’ve not uploaded it because it’s copywrite appears in question.

No political agenda on my part, just a fascinating story.

Photo above of Nixon greeting McCain is in the public domain [Wikipedia Commons].

Program of Study – M.A. Military History – American Civil War

For those interested, I have posted the full program of study for my Masters program on “the courses” page here. It’s pretty solid at this point with the exception of an elective.

I’ve now purchased all required books for my upcoming course, “Studies in U.S. Military History” which starts April 7th. It’s a BIG stack. As is my custom, the full reading list is posted on “the courses” page. I had previously posted more detail on that course here. Recall that it covers most of America’s major wars and should provide an excellent survey.  Can’t wait!

I’m finishing up an essay on ethics as related to historians due today so will get back to my two series posts on (1) Jomini and (2) The Temperment of Military Leaders when completed.

On the Temperment of Military Leaders – I

GrantThe review of Jomini’s theories on the art of war brought back some thoughts about the purpose of military philosophy itself and a debate we had in class over whether the conduct of war – in all of its complexity – should be reduced to principles, systems, models, tactics, etc. I suggested that war has both quantifiable and unquantifiable aspects. Arguably, it is the unquantifiable – human passions, values, and beliefs – that bring us to war as nations and as individuals. These same things certainly contribute to war’s unpredictability. To mitigate against the unpredictable, we focus on that which is quantifiable: structure, planning, training and execution. Systems, categorization and modeling allow better problem solving, preparation, and control. In war, as in any complex human endeavor, they can also reduce the risk of failure and conversely increase the probability of “the win.”

All of that said, I would suggest that there are deeper reasons why those responsible for the conduct of war focus on systems and organization and it has to do with their innate personalities. While there is debate about whether successfully military leadership can be attributed to personality type, I believe that there is good evidence that it can. David Keirsey and Marilyn Bates built upon the research of Carl Jung (archetypes), Katheryn Briggs, Isabel Myers (Myers-Briggs Trait Indicator), and a host of others in identifying distinct types of personalities. Keirsey introduced the concept of “temperaments” which, he suggests, “places a signature or thumbprint on each of one’s actions, making it recognizably one’s own.”  While I won’t go into details on the building blocks of the temperaments, I will focus on description of those traits Keirsey suggests are often seen in commanders of the military and I’ll give an example from the Civil War. It’s fascinating stuff. More in the next post…

Jomini on the Nature of War – Part IV – The Basics

This post continues from Jomini on the Nature of War: Part I Introduction here, Part II The Burgeoning Military Theorist here, and Part III The Founder of Modern Strategy here. Please note links in blue lead to additional information on those topics.

Battle Map

JominiJomini was a list maker and a categorizer which influenced the form of his thoughts on the nature of war. His work, The Art of War, begins with a definition of the art of war in terms of five military branches: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering and Minor Tactics.

Strategy – “the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war either for defense or for invasion; the art of making war upon the map.”

Grand Tactics – “the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into actions, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map.” It is “the maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different formations of troops for attack.”

Logistics – “the art of moving armies and the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises” and “comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics.”

Engineering – “the attack and defense of fortifications.

Minor Tactics

Jomini adds a sixth branch which he calls, “Diplomacy in its relation to War.” This he envisions as the role of the statesman in war and particularly in those activities which lead up to it. He provides the criteria from which a statesman can conclude whether a war is “proper, opportune, or indispensable.” He lists succinctly and thoroughly his perspective on the reasons why a government would choose to enter into war:  

  • “To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;
  • to protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce, manufactures, or agriculture;
  • to uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the safety of the government or the balance of power;
  • to fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;
  • to propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to defend them;
  • to increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of territory;
  • to defend the threatened independence of the state;
  • to avenge insulted honor; or
  • from a mania for conquest.”

Each reason becomes a “type” of war on which Jomini elaborates with examples from history. The type of war, The Art of War by Baron De Jomini - Special Editionhe suggests, “influences in some degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for the proposed end.”

Should you have interest in reading de Jomini’s The Art of War, it is available both on Google Books here and at Project Gutenberg here.
——
Jomini, Antoine Henri de. The Art of War, trans. by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill., Special Edition, (El Paso: EL Paso Norte Press. 2005), 9.
A map for the w:en:Battle of the Gebora, in 19 February 1811. Source can be found here. Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document (refers to map) under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation license, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled “GNU Free Documentation license“.